Part I, Question 2: Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity (propeteia) and impuissance (astheneia). The individual who is weak goes through a process of observance and sacrifices a choice; but rather than act in consonance with his apprehension out choice, he acts nether the play of a passion. By contrast, the impetuous soul does not go through a process of reflection and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no infixed conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. Aristotles discussion of akrasia relates to a position held by Socrates. When he origin introduces the topic of akrasia, and analyzes some of the problems involved in fellow feeling it, he says that Socrates held that there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a dissertation that clearly conflicts with the appearances. Since he says that his goal is to pr eserve as galore(postnominal) of the appearances as possible, it may come as a awe that when he analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion that in a way Socrates was right after(prenominal) all. For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is melodic make-up to be unqualified knowledge.
In a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not. But Aristotles harmony with Socrates is exclusively partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or evacuate reason. Emotion challenges reason in all terce of these ways. In both the ak ratic and the enkratic, it competes with rea! son for control over action. flush when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it... If you penury to get a full essay, order it on our website: BestEssayCheap.com
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